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I. PRELUDE 
In early November 2015, we stood in a Mankato, Minnesota, 
courtroom and held our breaths as a jury announced the fate of our 
client, a man we had come to love. Levi Minissale is a former Marine 
who never should have served in the military due to severe mental 
illness, but who did serve in some of the worst fighting of the Afghan 
war. Now, he faced a sentence of life without parole, because he had 
done at home what the Marines taught him to do in war: killed his 
ex-girlfriend and attempted to kill her husband. We had argued at 
trial that, in a perfect storm of mental illness, military conditioning, 
and violent combat experiences, Levi was following the orders of a 
voice in his head that he perceived to be God to kill these people 
and was therefore not criminally responsible for his actions. 
“Not guilty by reason of mental illness” was read for all four counts, 
starting with first-degree murder. This was the first such jury verdict 
in a Minnesota murder case in more than thirty years and only the 
second such verdict in the country for a veteran of our current wars. 
With tears of relief, we grabbed Levi to hug him, then stood by as he 
shared hugs with his emotional family members. We then saw him 
off to his civil commitment at the state mental hospital, where he 
would receive treatment for his illness and, one day, have a chance 
to return home to his family. Seeing Levi’s mother hug him for the 
first time in two-and-a-half years was one of the most rewarding 
moments of our lives. 
Levi’s case was an ideal opportunity to apply many of the special 
strategies and cultural competencies we have worked so hard over 
the past decade to develop and spread throughout the nation’s 
criminal defense bar. We had the honor of working with two amazing 
psychological experts, Drs. Jennifer Service and Ernest Boswell, in 
discovering and ultimately telling the story of the very foreign 
landscape of Levi’s ill mind. We were inspired by the courage of 
Levi’s former squad leader to boldly tell the jury of how Levi 
struggled in the Marine Corps and about his rapid mental 
2
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deterioration under the strain of intense combat. We were grateful 
to the former Marine officer, who had served in the same area of 
Afghanistan, as he educated the jury on the nature of modern 
counter insurgency warfare and its confusing, morally ambiguous 
nature. We formed a bond with the Minissale family and were 
amazed by their bravery in the face of such incredible scrutiny, 
uncertainty, and turmoil. Despite the long time it took to prepare 
and the risks we faced, they never lost faith in our ability to tell Levi’s 
story. Finally, we were awe struck by a jury that looked at both the 
horror of Levi’s offense and his experiences, taking on the 
incredible weight of their decision and finding in their hearts the 
ability to stand for justice, which in this case required forgiveness. 
Levi’s trial was also rewarding because we have made—and, we 
hope, kept—a commitment to helping veterans like Levi who would 
likely not be in criminal trouble but for their military service. We 
have worked to establish best practices for the defense of veterans 
whose service-related disorders, such as posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI), significantly contributed to 
their criminal behavior. We wrote The Attorney’s Guide to Defending 
Veterans in Criminal Court (hereinafter Defending Veterans), a treatise 
on the art and science of such defenses. We also founded the 
Veterans Defense Project (VDP), a nonprofit corporation seeking to 
educate attorneys nationally on these issues to help ensure that they, 
and the American justice system as a whole, do a better job in dealing 
with this generation of veterans than we did with past generations. 
This article is an excerpt from that text, and we hope it continues to 
aid attorneys, families, and other advocates in fighting on behalf of 
our warriors when their lives are on the line. We all know they would 
readily have done the same for us in their service. 
II. INTRODUCTION
A combat veteran arrested and charged in the criminal justice 
system presents an irony absent from most other cases: a man or 
woman who was once willing to sacrifice his or her life and do 
violence to protect our nation and our system of government now 
faces violence, be it incarceration or execution, at the hands of that 
same government. Professor Youngjae Lee of Fordham University 
School of Law has argued that when veterans’ military service and 
resulting psychological damage lead to criminal activity, “the State’s 
3
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standing to condemn their behavior is undermined because the 
State itself has caused the condition leading to the crimes.”2 
As criminal defense attorneys, we are all that stands between 
these protectors and the nation they sacrificed to protect. We are the 
only ones who can hold the State, and society as a whole, accountable 
for its role in their behavior. Ours is a sacred duty. We must defend 
these veterans with the same focus and intensity with which they 
defended us. The United States Supreme Court agrees. Its recent 
landmark decision, Porter v. McCollum, makes this our legal duty as 
well.3 
The veteran defendant’s service can be relevant throughout the 
case, from pre-charge and plea negotiations to trial and sentencing 
mitigation. When possible, the prosecutor should be made aware of 
the veteran’s service, any service-related mental health problems, 
and available treatment options before charges are even filed to 
allow consideration of these factors in the charging decision. Before 
trial, defense attorneys can point to the veteran’s service, connection 
to the community, and veterans’ organizations, which offer 
treatment resources and supervision, in arguing for pretrial release. 
If the veteran is suffering from a service-related PTSD or TBI, the 
need for treatment and available treatment resources can be used 
both in plea negotiations and sentencing. Such conditions may even 
be exculpatory, providing the basis for an insanity defense, a self-
defense claim, an automatism defense, or negating the mens rea 
requirement of the crime. 
III. BUILDING ON THE WORK OF THE VIETNAM GENERATION’S
DEFENDERS 
We owe much to the pioneers, the defense attorneys and mental 
health experts who, in the wake of Vietnam, first brought combat 
trauma–based defenses into American courtrooms. Armed with little 
more than a newly recognized PTSD diagnosis, their own 
experiences, and courage to stand up for the veterans on whom our 
2. Youngjae Lee, Military Veterans, Culpability, and Blame, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
285, 301 (2013). 
3. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009) (holding that a defense
attorney’s failure to present veteran defendant’s combat service and its related 
trauma as a mitigating factor at sentencing is proper grounds for a claim of 
prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984)). 
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nation had turned its back, their relentless and passionate advocacy 
saved many lives and paved the way for the transformations in the 
justice system we are seeing today. We would not be in the position 
to properly prepare for the coming wave of troubled veterans 
without the relentless, and often discouraged, work of that 
generation’s defenders. While we could never adequately 
acknowledge all of these advocates, some deserve specific mention. 
Starting in the early 1970s, years before PTSD was even formally 
recognized, Floyd “Shad” Meshad, a Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) social worker, essentially practiced law without a license, 
advocating on behalf of his veteran patients in the Los Angeles 
criminal courts. Meshad’s foray into legal practice was necessary in 
this era because, unfortunately, there were an insufficient number 
of attorneys prepared to take up the cause of troubled combat 
veterans, especially in areas like San Diego and Los Angeles where 
such veterans were overloading the system as it was. Meshad’s 
experience as an Army Social Worker/Psychology Officer in 
Vietnam, along with his reputation as a pioneering VA outreach 
specialist on the streets of Los Angeles, earned him credibility and 
respect in the courts. His advocacy was ahead of its time and helped 
many of his veteran patients avoid jail time in favor of treatment. 
Meshad details his early advocacy in Chapter 3 of Defending Veterans.4 
Meshad eventually found the ideal attorney to take over the 
actual legal representation of his veteran patients. Barry Levin was a 
highly decorated Vietnam combat veteran who shared Meshad’s 
deep passion for defending his fellow veterans. Levin and Meshad 
eventually created a veterans defense team, which included some of 
the other top PTSD experts in the country. Together, they traveled 
the nation defending many high profile Vietnam veteran cases 
throughout the 1980s. Later, Levin and David Ferrier,5 another 
member of the team, distilled their years of hard-won experience in 
their book, Defending the Vietnam Combat Veteran,6 the direct 
predecessor to Defending Veterans. 
4. Shad Meshad, The War at Home: Learning from the Aftermath of Vietnam as We
Prepare for the Coming Wave, in DEFENDING VETERANS, supra note 1, at 73. 
5. David Ferrier, a Vietnam combat veteran, VA counselor, and private
investigator, whose role on the veterans defense team was to investigate and 
document their clients’ military service, shares his expertise in Chapter 14 of 
DEFENDING VETERANS. See David Ferrier, Understanding and Documenting Your Veteran 
Client’s Military Service, in DEFENDING VETERANS, supra note 1, at 337. 
6. BARRY LEVIN & DAVID FERRIER, DEFENDING THE VIETNAM COMBAT VETERAN:
5
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Levin and his team’s first client was Albert Dobbs, a troubled 
Vietnam veteran already serving a lengthy prison term for armed 
robbery in Louisiana. They took Dobbs’s case pro bono after seeing 
it profiled in an ABC documentary entitled Vietnam Requiem.7 Levin 
filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus, arguing an insufficient pre-sentence 
investigation, and won Dobbs a resentencing in 1982. In discussing 
Mr. Dobbs’s case, Levin summarized what is, generally, the strategy 
promoted in Defending Veterans: 
What I successfully demonstrated to the Court was that 
Albert not only was a clearly defined case of [PTSD], but 
that his actions were directly linked to the disorder. This 
was accomplished by educating the Court [on] the 
symptoms of PTSD and presenting Albert’s military and 
post-military behaviors as grievously impacted by this 
condition.8 
Levin and his team ultimately gained Dobbs’s release from 
prison and full pardon by the Governor of Louisiana.9 Upon his 
release, the team brought Dobbs to California where he began 
treatment with Ferrier, who at the time was still a counselor with the 
VA.10 With Ferrier’s help, Dobbs was able to rebuild his life and learn 
to cope with his PTSD.11 
Wellborn Jack Jr. holds the distinction of being the first attorney 
in America to mount a successful PTSD-based murder defense of a 
veteran. Jack defended Charles Heads, a Marine Recon veteran, in 
Louisiana in 1981, arguing that he was in a dissociative flashback at 
the time he shot and killed his brother-in-law. The jury agreed, 
finding Heads not guilty by reason of insanity.12 Jack joined Barry 
Levin and the rest of his team the following year in defending Albert 
Dobbs. 
RECOGNITION AND REPRESENTATION OF THE MILITARY HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF
THE COMBAT VETERAN LEGAL CLIENT (1989). 
7. ABC News received the Peabody Award in 1983 for Vietnam Requiem. See
Vietnam Requiem, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0203184/ (last visited May 8, 2017). 




12. State v. Heads, No. 106, 126 (La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 10, 1981); see also Wellborn
Jack, The Vietnam Connection: Charles Heads’ Verdict, in LEVIN & FERRIER, supra note 6, 
at 91 (Jack’s own detailed account of the Heads trial). 
6
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Attorney and Law Professor Peter Erlinder was also a pioneer of 
the PTSD defense, beginning with his co-defense of Jearl Wood, 
another of the first successful combat PTSD-based insanity 
defenses.13 Erlinder went on to author the first, and still among the 
best, law review articles on combat PTSD-based insanity defenses.14 
He also served as a consultant and expert witness in many more 
PTSD cases and presented numerous seminars to attorneys and 
mental health experts on the application of PTSD to legal issues. The 
successful trial defenses in the Heads and Wood cases set the standard 
for PTSD defenses to follow.15 
While Meshad, Levin, Ferrier, Jack, and Erlinder deserve special 
mention, many others—too many to credit here—did similar work. 
These pioneers were ahead of their time, and though they saved 
many Vietnam veterans, they were but a few standing against a tidal 
wave of veterans flooding into America’s criminal courts. It would 
ultimately take our nation and its justice system decades to catch up. 
In the meantime, the most troubled Vietnam veterans in the system 
did not benefit from these innovative defenses. To the extent their 
military service was taken into consideration at all, it was often held 
against them. They either were told that, as veterans, they should 
have “known better,” or, worse, were demonized for their service in 
an unpopular war and discarded into cages, in misguided attempts 
to protect the public. 
Our society’s failures with the Vietnam generation have cost us 
in countless enduring ways. Fortunately, we seem to be learning from 
those mistakes. We are building on the work of the pioneers in 
veterans’ defense and transforming the way the entire justice system 
interacts with troubled veterans. We owe those pioneers a perpetual 
debt for “prepping the objective” for us.16 
13. See People v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Ill. Dist Ct. May 5, 1982).
14. See C. Peter Erlinder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Vietnam Veterans and the
Law: Challenge to Effective Representation, BEHAV. SCI. & L., Summer 1983, at 25–50; see 
also C. Peter Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
Criminal Conduct, 25 B.C. L. REV. 305 (1984) [hereinafter Erlinder, Paying the Price for 
Vietnam]; C. Peter Erlinder, Vietnam on Trial: Developing a Conceptual Framework for 
Presenting and Explaining PTSD in a Forensic Setting, 42 GUILD PRAC. 65 (1985)
[hereinafter Erlinder, Vietnam on Trial]. 
15. For a more in-depth discussion on the successful trial defenses in the Heads
and Wood cases, as well as others, see generally Brockton D. Hunter & Ryan C. Else, 
Legal Strategies for Defending the Combat Veteran in Criminal Court, in DEFENDING
VETERANS, supra note 1, at 414–20. 
16. “Prepping the objective” is a military term for bombardment to weaken an
7
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IV. THE CHANGING TERRAIN: LEGAL TRENDS FAVORING TREATMENT
OVER INCARCERATION FOR VETERANS 
In the 2009 landmark case Porter v. McCollum, the United States 
Supreme Court marked its approval of a growing legal trend towards 
lenity and a therapeutic approach to criminally involved veterans.17 
Porter recognized that “[o]ur Nation has a long tradition of 
according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service.”18 This 
finding was a loud and clear endorsement of the principles 
underlying the development of state veteran-sentencing statutes and 
veterans treatment courts that had already begun. The decision in 
Porter was followed by amendments to the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines19 and a vast expansion of the use of veterans treatment 
courts throughout the United States.20 These developments evince a 
strong legal trend and changing legislative intent that pervades all 
levels of government. 
Porter cited to two veteran-specific sentencing statutes to support 
its finding that “the relevance of Porter’s extensive combat 
experience is not only that he served honorably under extreme 
hardship and gruesome conditions, but also that the jury might find 
mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that 
combat took on Porter.”21 The two statutes were section 1170.9 of 
the California Penal Code—created in 2007—and section 609.115, 
subdivision 10 of the Minnesota Statutes—created in 2008—which 
served as the proverbial “tip of the spear” in creating legal 
mechanisms unique to veteran defendants with service-related 
disorders. As of early 2017, there are a total of five states with veterans 
sentencing statutes.22 There are five more states with statutes 
enemy position before an infantry assault. 
17. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009).
18. Id.
19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2010) (“Military service may be relevant in determining whether a departure is 
warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination with other offender 
characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the 
typical cases covered by the guidelines.”). 
20. Cf. Veterans Treatment Court Locations, JUST. FOR VETS, 
http://www.justiceforvets.org/veterans-treatment-court-locations (identifying the 
locations of veterans treatment courts around the United States and its territories 
as of December 31, 2014). 
21. Porter, 558 U.S. at 43–44.
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1170.9 (West, Westlaw through 2016); MINN. 
STAT. § 609.115, subdiv. 10 (2016); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
8
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imposing a duty on the court, the VA, or community corrections to 
inquire about veteran status, inform the veteran about services 
available, or consider a veteran’s service-related disorder in creating 
a treatment plan.23 
The existence of veteran treatment courts also signals a trend 
toward favoring a therapeutic approach to veteran defendants with 
service-related disorders. In December 2011, The Atlantic reported 
that “[n]early 80 veterans courts have sprung up across the country 
over the past four years, and 20 more are expected to open by the 
end of [2011].”24 By mid-2012, there were “168 formally established 
Veterans Treatment Courts, Veterans Courts, Veterans Dockets or 
tracks within Mental Health and/or Drug Treatment Courts, or 
criminal Courts,” and “[s]ince the courts’ inception, 7,724 Veterans 
have been admitted, and 3,883 of these Veterans are still being 
monitored by and treated through the courts.”25 The rapid growth 
of these courts across the country signals a national acceptance of 
their underlying principles favoring therapeutic treatment over 
incarceration or punishment. As of early 2017, there are ten states 
with statutes authorizing the creation of veterans treatment courts or 
analogous veteran treatment programs.26 
COMMENTARY § 3.F (MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N 2016); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 176.015 (West, Westlaw through 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-b (West, 
Westlaw through 2016); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-29-5 (West, Westlaw through 
2016). 
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1449; IOWA CODE ANN. § 356.6A (West, Westlaw
through 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.515 (West, Westlaw through 2016); MINN. 
STAT. § 243.251; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2001.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016). 
24. Kristina Shevory, Why Veterans Should Get Their Own Courts, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/why 
-veterans-should-get-their-own-courts/8716/. 
25. JIM MCGUIRE ET AL., AN INVENTORY OF VA INVOLVEMENT IN VETERANS COURTS,
DOCKETS AND TRACKS 5, 7 (2013), http://www.justiceforvets.org/sites/default 
/files/files/An%20Inventory%20of%20VA%20involvement%20in%20Veterans 
%20Courts.pdf. 
26. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-144 (West, Westlaw through 2016); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56l (West, Westlaw through 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.47891 
(West, Westlaw through 2016); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 167 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-23-16-11 (West, Westlaw through 2016); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276A, § 10 (West, Westlaw through 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 4, § 433 (West, Westlaw through 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1201 
(West, Westlaw through 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176A.280; TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 124.002 (West, Westlaw through 2015). 
9
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The United States Congress is also taking significant interest in 
the reintegration issues faced by veterans with service-related 
disorders. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 mandated that the Institute of Medicine of the National 
Academy of Sciences conduct an unprecedented governmental 
study of PTSD and its effects on service members,27 “reflecting 
congressional concern about the number of service members and 
veterans who were at risk for or had received a diagnosis of PTSD.”28 
The study found that “PTSD is commonly associated with substance 
abuse, unregulated anger, aggressive behavior, and hazardous use of 
alcohol, all of which are themselves associated with legal problems 
and incarceration”29 and that “outreach to veterans who have PTSD 
and who are incarcerated or have been recently released may help 
them to access comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation options 
to improve functioning and reduce the risk of recidivism and future 
legal problems.”30 
These recent developments reflect a growing public recognition 
that when our Nation sends young men and women to prepare for 
and fight wars, as San Diego Prosecutor William C. Gentry so 
eloquently stated, “[y]ou are unleashing certain things in a human 
being we don’t allow in civic society, and getting it all back in the box 
can be difficult for some people.”31 The public, courts, and elected 
leaders nationwide are beginning to recognize that the responsibility 
for these veterans falls on all of the American public. Thus, even 
where these statutes are not applicable and specialty courts are not 
available, this change in public sentiment should be used to argue to 
judges that they also have a duty to show compassion toward and 
promote the rehabilitation of veteran defendants. 
V. PRE-TRIAL STRATEGIES 
Even before charges are filed by the State, there is an 
opportunity for the defendant’s military service to become relevant 
27. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009). 
28. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TREATMENT FOR POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER IN MILITARY AND VETERAN POPULATIONS: INITIAL ASSESSMENT 2 (2012). 
29. Id. at 322.
30. Id.
31. Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign
Battles, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/us/13vets.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
10
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and maybe even dispositive. Prosecutors wield incredible discretion 
to decline or under-charge an offense. A veteran client’s military 
service may be relevant to many of the National District Attorneys 
Association’s (NDAA) factors for screening whether to charge or 
what to charge, including: doubt as to the accused’s guilt, the 
availability of suitable diversion and rehabilitative programs, the 
attitudes and mental status of the accused, the characteristics of the 
offender, and “any other . . . mitigating circumstances.”32 These 
factors show that there are various reasons why a prosecutor should 
consider a veteran defendant’s military service in the charging 
decision or in the context of a plea agreement. Many states have 
created valuable statutory tools that may be implemented at the 
pretrial stage. Diversion to a veterans treatment court is expressly 
authorized in ten states,33 and five states provide duties that the 
court, the state, or community corrections must perform.34 
Prosecutorial sympathy for veterans has been tested and shown 
as significant, at least with respect to minor offenses, through social 
science research as well.35 A University of Alabama study polled a 
32. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N (NDAA), NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS
50–52 (3d ed. 2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed. 
%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf; see also Hans Sinha, Prosecutorial Ethics: The 
Charging Decision, 41 PROSC. 32, 39 (2007). 
33. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-144 (West, Westlaw through 2016); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-56e, 54-56l (West, Westlaw through 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 394.47891, 948.16, 948.08, 948.21 (West, Westlaw through 2016); 730 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 167/1–35 (West, Westlaw through 2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-23-16-11 
(West, Westlaw through 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276A, §§ 10–11 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 433 (West, Westlaw through 
2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.1200–12 (West, Westlaw through 2016); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 176A.280–95 (West, Westlaw through 2016); TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. §§ 617.001–617.006 (West, Westlaw through 2015). 
34. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1449 (West, Westlaw through 2016)
(mandating duty for pretrial probation screening of military service); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 356.6A (West, Westlaw through 2016) (requiring jail personnel to inquire as 
to veteran status and inform veterans about available resources); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 431.515 (West, Westlaw through 2016) (requiring that pretrial officers identify
veterans and provide contact information for veteran-specific service providers); 
MINN. STAT. § 243.251 (2016) (requiring the commissioner of corrections to 
determine whether a veteran inmate’s service “was unduly stressful” and, if so, to 
consider that fact in developing a corrections plan); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2001.1 
(West, Westlaw through 2016) (directing the Department of Veterans Services to 
establish a veterans service program). 
35. See, e.g., Jennifer Kelly Wilson et al., Prosecutor Pretrial Attitudes and Plea-
Bargaining Behavior Toward Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 8 PSYCHOL. 
11
Hunter and Else: Legal Strategies for Defending the Combat Veteran in CriminalCour
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
482 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3 
sample of thirty-five active prosecutors from Alabama, Mississippi, 
California, and Kansas regarding a charged assault with consistent 
fact patterns and four types of defendants: veterans with PTSD, 
veterans without PTSD, non-veterans with PTSD, and a control 
group that was neither a veteran nor had PTSD.36 The veteran 
defendant with PTSD had been in a blast that struck his vehicle, 
injuring him and killing two others from his unit, and the non-
veteran with PTSD had been in a car accident that injured him and 
killed a passenger.37 The following findings suggest significant 
sympathy for both veteran groups amongst prosecutors: 
Overall, prosecutors viewed veterans as less blameworthy 
for the low-level offense than nonveterans. As 
hypothesized, prosecutors were significantly more likely to 
empathize and identify with veteran defendants, as well as 
find them less criminally culpable, than with nonveteran 
defendants . . . . We anticipated that prosecutors would 
recommend similar sentences and dispositions to veterans 
and nonveterans alike, but sentencing leniency for veterans 
almost reached statistical significance. A further important 
finding was that veterans were offered significantly more 
treatment-focused diversion programs than nonveteran 
defendants, as opposed to simply jail or probation.38 
The study found that veterans overall, both with and without 
PTSD, were perceived by prosecutors as less culpable: “The hierarchy 
of least to most culpable was veterans with PTSD, veterans without 
PTSD, nonveterans with PTSD, and nonveterans without PTSD; 
however, the absolute differences were small between conditions.”39 
The authors of the study hypothesized that the reason for this is that 
“in the case of defendants who are military veterans, prosecutors may 
recognize that some experience significant practical and 
psychological barriers to readjustment to civilian life. Thus, veterans 
may be found somewhat less culpable for committing crimes and 
may receive a treatment approach from the courts, instead of 
retribution.”40 
SERVS. 319 (2011). 
36. Id. at 321.
37. Id. at 322.
38. Id. at 326.
39. Id. at 327.
40. Id.
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There is at least significant anecdotal evidence that this same 
rationale among prosecutors extends to serious violent crimes as 
well. The case of Matthew Sepi in Las Vegas, Nevada, is an excellent 
example of prosecutorial declination, or refusal to charge, due to his 
public defender’s efforts to educate the prosecutor about the 
veteran client’s service and its relevance.41 In Brock Savelkoul’s case 
in Watford City, North Dakota, defense counsel used pretrial release 
to establish a treatment record—a strategy which can demonstrate a 
veteran client’s amenability to probationary treatment and even 
secure a plea-agreement for diverting charges based upon the 
veteran client’s completion of available courses of PTSD-specific 
treatment at the VA. Both of these cases involved serious violent 
charged offenses, showing the potential influence of the veteran’s 
service and available resources on prosecutors’ charging decisions. 
A. Prosecutorial Declination: Nevada v. Matthew Sepi 
In the summer of 2005, Matthew Sepi walked to the 7-Eleven in 
his violent Las Vegas neighborhood with an AK-47 concealed 
underneath a trench coat and bought two tall cans of beer.42 The 
beer was to self-medicate Mr. Sepi’s PTSD symptoms.43 On the way 
home, he entered an alley where he encountered two large, armed 
gang members. Upon seeing a butt of a gun, seeing a flash, and 
hearing a bang, in the words of Mr. Sepi, he “engaged the targets” 
and “broke contact” with the enemy by firing rounds at the two 
people, escaping to his home the way he would return to his home 
unit in a fire-fight and loading his car with 180 rounds of 
ammunition.44 One of his “targets” died, and one was left wounded. 
Mr. Sepi was arrested and booked. 
Mr. Sepi’s public defender was Nancy Lemcke, who would work 
to build sympathy for Mr. Sepi within the law enforcement 
community and county attorney’s office.45 Detective Laura Anderson 
was convinced that Mr. Sepi was falling back on his military training 
when he carried the AK-47, and she “felt very bad for him.”46 It did 
not hurt Mr. Sepi that the people he shot were gang members who 
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tested positive for alcohol, cocaine, and methamphetamines. Still, 
Ms. Lemcke was able to capitalize on the sympathy of the officers, 
the support of fellow soldiers and veterans’ advocates, Mr. Sepi’s 
service record, and available VA treatment resources to reach an 
excellent agreement with the State. The parties agreed that “in 
exchange for the successful completion of treatment for substance 
abuse and PTSD, the charges against Mr. Sepi would be dropped.”47 
B. Pretrial Diversion for Treatment: North Dakota v. Brock Savelkoul 
The story of Brock Savelkoul’s armed-standoff with the North 
Dakota State Patrol was well-documented by National Public Radio: 
At 8:20 p.m. on Sept. 21, 2010, Iraq veteran Brock 
Savelkoul decided it was time to die. He lurched from his 
black Tacoma pickup truck, gripping a 9-mm pistol. In 
front of him, a half-dozen law enforcement officers 
crouched behind patrol cars with their weapons drawn. 
They had surrounded him on a muddy red road after an 
hourlong chase that reached speeds of 105 miles per hour. 
Savelkoul stared at the ring of men and women before 
ducking into the cab of his truck. He cranked up the radio. 
A country song about whiskey and cigarettes wafted out 
across an endless sprawl of North Dakota farmland, 
stubbled from the recent harvest. Sleet was falling, chilling 
the air. Savelkoul, 29, walked slowly toward the officers. He 
gestured wildly with his gun. “Go ahead, shoot me! . . . 
Please, shoot me,” he yelled, his face illuminated in a 
chiaroscuro of blazing spotlights and the deepening 
darkness. “Do it. Pull it. Do I have to point my gun at you 
to . . . do it?” 
Twenty feet away, the officers shifted nervously. Some 
placed their fingers on the triggers of their shotguns and 
took aim at Savelkoul’s chest. They were exhausted, on 
edge after the chase and long standoff. They knew only the 
sketchiest of details about the man in front of them, his 
blond hair short, his face twisted in grief and anger. 
Dispatchers had told them that Savelkoul had been 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. 
They warned that he might have been drinking. Family 
members told police that Savelkoul had fled his home with 
six weapons, including a semi-automatic assault rifle and 
several hundred rounds of hollow point ammunition. To 
47. Id.
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Megan Christopher, a trooper with the North Dakota 
Highway Patrol, Savelkoul’s intentions seemed obvious. 
“Suicide by cop,” she thought. “He wants to go out in a 
blaze of glory.”48 
Two hours later, as a result of the calm prodding of Trooper 
Christopher, Mr. Savelkoul put down his weapons, was arrested and 
charged with three felonies and one misdemeanor, and was detained 
on $20,000 bond.49 
Brock Savelkoul served three combat tours in Iraq and was 
diagnosed with PTSD, depression, insomnia, anxiety disorder, 
hypersensitivity, hypervigilance, and leg pain from a shrapnel 
wound.50 As the local newspaper, The Bismarck Tribune, would report, 
this was “a case where the judge, the state’s attorney, the public 
defender, the county veterans service officer and others agreed that 
this man needed treatment first, the law second.”51 As such, at a 
preliminary hearing on October 6, 2010, the judge agreed to reduce 
Mr. Savelkoul’s detention bond to $1,000 on the condition that he 
enter and remain in treatment at the Fargo, North Dakota, VA 
Medical Center and later be transferred to a forty-five-day PTSD 
program at the St. Cloud, Minnesota, VA Medical Center as soon as 
a bed was available.52 The McKenzie County Veterans Service 
Officer, Jerry Samuelson, said that he had “never seen this before 
. . . . The judge, the state’s attorney, the public defender, they’re all 
doing the right thing.”53 
Five months later, on March 4, 2011, McKenzie County State 
Attorney Dennis Johnson and the public defender reached an 
exceptionally lenient agreement. Mr. Savelkoul would plead guilty 
to the misdemeanor reckless driving charge, with a stayed thirty-day 
48. T. Christian Miller & Daniel Zwerdling, ‘Suicide By Cop’ Leads Soldier on Chase
of His Life, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011 
/03/22/134657905/suicide-by-cop-leads-soldier-on-chase-of-his-life.
49. Lauren Donovan, Iraqi Vet Asks for Treatment, Not Jail After Armed Standoff,
BISMARCK TRIB. (Sept. 29, 2010), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/iraqi-vet 
-asks-for-treatment-not-jail-after-armed-standoff/article_8425df6c-cc48-11df-be46     
-001cc4c03286.html. 
50. Id.
51. Lauren Donovan, Court Agrees to Treatment for Iraq War Veteran Brock Savelkoul
Before Legal Proceedings, BISMARCK TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2010), http://bismarcktribune.com 





Hunter and Else: Legal Strategies for Defending the Combat Veteran in CriminalCour
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
486 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3 
jail sentence, and the state would conditionally suspend prosecution 
of the three felonies.54 If Mr. Savelkoul abided by the seven 
conditions, including “that he remain in counseling until a mental 
health professional says it’s no longer needed,” for three years, the 
three felonies would be dismissed.55 The prosecution must have 
worried that the court would not accept such a lenient agreement, 
as Dennis Johnson argued to the judge on Mr. Savelkoul’s behalf 
that the criminal acts were caused by PTSD and that “consciously, or 
not, [Mr. Savelkoul] wanted to die by law enforcement.”56 
Both of these cases illustrate the benefits of informing the 
prosecutor about a veteran client’s military service and its relevance 
as early in the case as is possible. The defense should work closely 
with the VA and other veteran or community resources to present a 
treatment plan that gives the prosecution a viable and reasonable 
alternative to prison time. When appropriate, pretrial release, 
conditioned on adherence to a structured mental health and 
chemical dependency treatment program, can be used to get the 
veteran into a treatment program more quickly. Subsequently, the 
veteran’s success in treatment can be used to show the prosecution 
and the court that the veteran is amenable to treatment and not a 
threat to public safety. For example, five months separated Mr. 
Savelkoul’s pretrial release and the plea agreement, ensuring the 
State that he did not pose a public safety risk. This five-month track 
record and the heavy consequences the State could levy if Mr. 
Savelkoul violated the agreed-upon conditions were apparently 
sufficient to satisfy the prosecution’s concerns. This is instructive of 
how the veteran’s service or mental illness can be used to cut charges 
off before trial. 
C. Caution: Due Diligence Required 
Unfortunately, history shows that it is essential that the veteran 
defendant’s attorney confirm the details of his or her client’s military 
service and resulting psychological injuries before moving forward. 
There have been publicized cases of defendants falsifying their status 
54. Lauren Donovan, Troubled Vet Enters Plea Agreement; Felony Charges Diverted,
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as veterans as well as veterans exaggerating their military experiences 
in order to assert a PTSD defense and/or gain leniency in 
sentencing. 
Some cases from the Vietnam generation illustrate how entire 
criminal proceedings, through sentencing, have been conducted 
without anyone discovering that the supposed veteran was a fraud. 
The following cases demonstrate the need for the attorney to 
conduct diligent research before utilizing the veteran client’s service 
record.57 These examples also show the need to verify every major 
fact upon which an expert witness relies in making his or her 
recommendations or conclusions.58 
The first case, People v. Lockett,59 illustrates that a supposed 
veteran can so convincingly falsify combat service that only a detailed 
review of military records will prevent the fraud from having a 
substantial effect on the legal proceedings. Samuel Lockett was 
charged with a series of eighteen robberies in Brooklyn, New York, 
during a thirty-day period at the end of 1980 and the beginning of 
1981.60 Mr. Lockett raised a PTSD-based insanity defense. In a pre-
plea examination by the prosecution’s psychiatrist, Mr. Lockett 
convinced the psychiatrist that he suffered from PTSD as a result of 
his service in the Vietnam War. The court would later note, 
“[D]efendant had consistently informed the examining psychiatrists 
at the various mental examinations that he had served in Vietnam 
where he had horrible combat experiences.”61 Based upon this 
evaluation, both the prosecution and the court consented to a plea 
of “not responsible by reason of a mental disease or defect,” 
terminating the criminal proceeding.62 
While awaiting a hearing on whether Mr. Lockett was 
dangerously mentally ill, the prosecution received a copy of Mr. 
Lockett’s military records, which had been subpoenaed earlier but 
delayed in their delivery. These records revealed that, though he was 
in the U.S. Air Force, Mr. Lockett had never been in Vietnam.63 On 
the prosecution’s motion, the court vacated the plea on the ground 
57. LEVIN & FERRIER, supra note 6, at 89–90.
58. See Erlinder, Vietnam on Trial, supra note 14, at 73.
59. People v. Lockett, 468 N.Y.S.2d 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), aff’d, Lockett v.
Juvilier, 490 N.Y.S.2d 764 (N.Y. 1985). 
60. Lockett v. Juvilier, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
61. Id. at 766–67.
62. Id. at 766.
63. Id.
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that it was induced by fraud, noting that Mr. Lockett’s 
“misrepresentations played a crucial part in [the examining 
psychiatrist’s] mental evaluations and opinions that he suffered from 
a posttraumatic stress disorder.”64 The Appellate Division ruled that 
the trial court lacked the power to vacate the plea. The Court of 
Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division and affirmed 
the trial court’s decision because “[c]ourts traditionally have 
inherent power to vacate orders and judgments obtained by fraud or 
misrepresentation.”65 
The second example illustrates the trap that legal and medical 
professionals must avoid in veterans criminal cases: the crafting of a 
false defense based on a service-related disorder. In October 1979, 
Michael Pard was charged with three counts of attempted murder 
after he chased his ex-wife, her husband, and an Oregon state 
trooper while firing a weapon at them from his vehicle.66 Mr. Pard’s 
attorney decided to assert a defense of diminished capacity and 
mental disease based upon service-related psychological trauma, 
hiring psychologist Dr. Kevin McGovern among other experts.67 
Dr. McGovern did not record his first interview with Mr. Pard 
but did record his second, during which  
Dr. McGovern asked a number of leading and suggestive 
questions designed to show that Michael was suffering from 
combat stress and that he had the symptoms of post 
traumatic stress disorder. It was during this videotaped 
session that Michael, crying, first told McGovern or any 
other doctor or therapist that he had killed three children 
in Vietnam, that he saw Karen’s face superimposed on 
theirs during nightmares, and that he experienced 
flashbacks to Vietnam when he was welding.68 
Building on Dr. McGovern’s questioning and conclusions, at 
trial Mr. Pard 
testified that during the four and one half months he was 
in Vietnam, he and the other crew chiefs flew sixteen hours 
a day during which time they averaged five combat 
missions. He also testified that he personally killed at least 
thirty people, and that he and his helicopter crew killed 
64. Id. at 766–67.
65. Id. at 767.
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four hundred persons. Michael also described how he had 
killed three Vietnamese children after one of them shot an 
American soldier, and how he and members of his crew 
rescued a general. Michael testified that he received the 
Distinguished Flying Cross for his part in the rescue of the 
general, and that he had also received a Bronze Star for 
valor.69 
Mr. Pard was found not guilty by reason of mental disease, 
escaping all criminal liability. Apparently emboldened by this 
victory, Mr. Pard and his wife Kerry then initiated two claims against 
the U.S. government totaling $9.5 million, claiming that the VA was 
responsible for the injuries resulting from his crimes because the VA 
negligently failed to diagnose and treat his PTSD.70 
It was the litigation of these subsequent civil claims that exposed 
the fraudulent nature of Mr. Pard’s criminal trial defense. Though 
the State had failed to call members of Mr. Pard’s military unit to 
testify during the criminal trial, the U.S. government called them 
during the civil trial. Mr. Pard’s commanding officer and fellow crew 
chief testified that their unit served mostly in an administrative 
capacity and saw very little, if any, combat. Mr. Pard’s commanding 
officer further stated “he had never recommended [Mr. Pard] for 
either the Bronze Star or the Distinguished Flying Cross, and that 
[Mr. Pard] would have been ineligible to receive them.”71 Mr. Pard’s 
service record confirmed that he never received either decoration. 
In dismissing Mr. and Mrs. Pards’ claims, the court determined “that 
Michael Pard did not suffer from [PTSD] and that the acts of 
violence he committed against his ex-wife . . . had no relationship to 
his war experiences or to any war-related illnesses.”72 
These fraudulent acts on the court are incredibly risky, 
particularly in the age of the internet, when social media and military 
alumni web sites make tracking down former members of a 
defendant’s unit easier than ever. The ramifications of getting 
caught can range from an aggravated sentence for the defendant to 
irreparable damage to the attorney’s credibility with the court. 
Perhaps most importantly, such frauds also undermine the 
credibility of legitimate veteran defendants earnestly seeking legal 
and public support in dealing with service-related disorders. 
69. Id. at 522.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 523.
72. Id. at 526.
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It is the attorney’s professional responsibility as an officer of the 
court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the 
adjudicative process,73 so it will be necessary to ensure the veteran’s 
story is consistent with his or her service records.74 
VI. TRIAL DEFENSES
In cases involving extreme service-related disorders, the 
veteran’s psychological injuries may be relevant to the determination 
of guilt or innocence because they may negate the requisite intent 
of the crime or mitigate the veteran’s legal culpability.75 A diagnosis 
of PTSD meets the scientific criteria of admissibility requirements 
announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.76 and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because 
PTSD has been empirically tested, it has been subjected to 
critique for several decades, and PTSD studies have been 
published and peer reviewed. PTSD has been accepted as 
textbook science by the scientific community for twenty 
years. Applying the Daubert factors, we have a falsifiable 
hypothesis and data that has been tested to support the 
theory. PTSD studies have been published in peer-reviewed 
journals and the diagnostic features are accepted in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV), so it fits well within the scope of general 
consensus. As with any medical diagnosis, there may be 
variations in judgment, but the underlying studies have met 
statistical criteria for validity.77 
These PTSD- or TBI-related defenses can be separated into four 
categories: (1) insanity defenses, negating all culpability; (2) self-
defense defenses based upon the veteran’s mistaken belief in the 
amount of force necessary to protect him or herself; (3) an 
73. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012).
74. For an in-depth explanation of how to properly document a veteran client’s
military service, see generally Ferrier, supra note 5, at 337–56. 
75. See Markku A. Sario, Brat Dog: Handling a PTSD-Based Insanity Defense, in
DEFENDING VETERANS, supra note 1, at 465. In Chapter 19 of DEFENDING VETERANS, 
Markku Sario describes the case of Jessie Bratcher, in which he successfully asserted 
an insanity defense in a murder trial based on the defendant’s PTSD and 
conditioned stimulus-response based on his combat training. See id. passim. 
76. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
77. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and
Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 30
(2001). 
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automatism defense when the veteran’s actions are the result of 
reflex, sleep-walking, or a conditioned stimulus response; and (4) 
mens rea defenses other than insanity defenses, mitigating the 
veteran’s culpability in order to reach a lesser-included-offense.78 
These categorizations blur when actually proving an insanity defense 
to a jury;79 but, for analytical purposes, it is helpful to examine them 
separately in forming a defense strategy. 
Psychological defenses based on PTSD differ in some significant 
ways from defenses based on other mental disorders because the 
source of the disorder, combat trauma, is readily identifiable and 
describable: 
Insanity cases are often tried before a judge and the goal of 
the attorney is usually to demonstrate that the events were 
so bizarre that insanity is required as a legal conclusion. 
The decision regarding the legal responsibility of the 
defendant in insanity cases is often totally dependent upon 
conflicting opinions advanced by mental health 
professionals, often with little opportunity for laymen to 
test the validity of those opinions. With PTSD, however, the 
source of the mental disorder can be described in great 
detail. It is also possible to show overt symptoms and 
behavior which allow the judge or jury to test the validity of 
the diagnosis.80 
A PTSD defense requires the presentation of at least four 
factors: (1) pre-trauma history as a baseline for the defendant’s 
behavior before the disorder, (2) history of the trauma, (3) post-
trauma history showing the change in the defendant, and (4) an 
expert evaluation of the defendant’s psychological condition and its 
connection to the crime.81 The PTSD defense theory, thus, provides 
for the potential admissibility of the defendant’s entire life in a way 
78. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Nicole A. Stockey, Last Stand? The Criminal
Responsibility of War Veterans Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder, 85 IND. L.J. 87, 107−32 (2010). See generally Daniel Burgess, Kara Coen 
& Nicole Stockey, Reviving the “Vietnam Defense”: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
Criminal Responsibility in a Post-Iraq/Afghanistan World, 29 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 59 
(2010); Alyson Sincavage, The War Comes Home: How Congress’ Failure to Address 
Veterans’ Mental Health Has Led to Violence in America, 33 NOVA. L. REV. 481, 495–96 
(2009). 
79. Markku Sario’s account of the Jessie Bratcher insanity defense in Chapter
19 of DEFENDING VETERANS demonstrates clearly how these categorizations blur 
when actually proving an insanity defense to a jury. See Sario, supra note 75. 
80. Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam, supra note 14, at 324.
81. Id. at 331.
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that allows the attorney a lot of creativity in presenting the 
defendant’s case to a judge or jury.82 
VII. SENTENCING
Historically, veterans have often received longer sentences than 
their civilian peers charged with the same offenses. A report by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics analyzing data as of 2004 stated, 
“[V]eterans had shorter criminal records than nonveterans in State 
prison, but reported longer prison sentences and expected to serve 
more time in prison than nonveterans . . . . On average veterans 
expected to serve twenty-two months longer than nonveterans.”83 
But the sentencing law landscape is shifting rapidly and dramatically. 
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court stated in Porter v. 
McCollum that 
[o]ur Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to 
veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those 
who fought on the front lines as [the Defendant] did.
Moreover, the relevance of [the Defendant’s] extensive 
combat experience is not only that he served honorably 
under extreme hardship and gruesome conditions, but 
also that the jury might find mitigating the intense stress 
and mental and emotional toll that combat took on [the 
Defendant].84 
In fact, Porter held that for a defense attorney to fail to present 
the defendant’s combat service and the resulting trauma as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing in a capital case is sufficient grounds 
82. See generally id. at 320. For a significantly more detailed presentation of
these defenses and how to apply them to the trial setting, see generally Brockton D. 
Hunter & Ryan C. Else, Legal Strategies for Defending the Combat Veteran in Criminal 
Court, in DEFENDING VETERANS, supra note 1, at 399. 
83. MARGARET E. NOONAN & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, VETERANS IN STATE AND
FEDERAL PRISON, 2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 1 (2004). 
84. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43–44 (2009).
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to support a Strickland85 claim of prejudicially ineffective assistance 
of counsel.86 
This “leniency” is often coupled with a desire to provide 
veterans with rehabilitative treatment to ensure they do not 
reoffend, and there are an increasing number of creative options to 
structure such treatment. The sample sentencing memorandum in 
Appendix G of Defending Veterans provides an example of how this 
process has been applied in one of our cases, and Chapter 20 of 
Defending Veterans, on sentencing, describes in greater detail the 
process our office has had success with in veteran sentencing 
arguments.87 
In addition to Porter’s assertion that the veteran defendant’s 
service should be recognized with leniency and that service-related 
disorders are relevant mitigating evidence, there is a novel and 
compelling argument to be made. The argument is that the 
government, through the prosecution or the court, is also culpable 
because it is the government’s wars and military indoctrination that 
created the source of the criminality: the veteran defendant’s service-
related disorder. Youngjae Lee, Professor of Law at Fordham 
University School of Law, makes this argument quite succinctly, even 
controlling for factors such as violations of Jus in Bello and Jus ad 
Bellum principles: 
Even if the State engages only in morally justified conflicts 
and even if we grant that the State’s efforts to train soldiers 
85. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two 
components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes 
both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the 
result unreliable. 
Id. at 687. 
86. Porter, 558 U.S. at 43–44.
87. See Brockton D. Hunter, Sample Sentencing Memorandum, in DEFENDING
VETERANS, supra note 1, app. G at 675; Brockton D. Hunter & Ryan C. Else, Sentencing 
Mitigation Strategies and Techniques, in DEFENDING VETERANS, supra note 1, at 483. 
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to obey orders and overcome their inhibitions to killing are 
not culpable, the State’s total, intimate, and intrusive 
involvement in shaping the soldiers’ psyche and day-to-day 
lives makes it difficult to declare that the State is not to 
share the blame in soldiers’ criminal behaviors, no matter 
the justness of the source of the criminality. In other words, 
to the extent that the State has created and operated the 
military and turned individuals into those capable of killing 
efficiently and deployed them into combat, the State must 
share the blame for some of the foreseeable negative 
manifestations of such training and deployments, even if 
we cannot say that the State has done anything wrong.88 
The footnote to this quotation further states, 
One implication of this argument, for those who are 
interested in implementation questions, is that courts, 
when deciding whether to grant a sentencing discount for 
offenders with military backgrounds, may bypass the vexing 
question as to whether a particular conflict is morally 
justified and still grant the discount, simply because 
mitigation is called for whether the war that a veteran was 
involved in was just or not.89 
While this argument does not affect legal standing for the state 
to pursue a conviction, it does challenge the state’s moral standing 
to pursue a strictly punitive sentence because it shares in the blame 
for the underlying causes of the criminality. Not only is this a 
mitigating factor, it requires from the government its sincere and 
persistent efforts toward rehabilitation to prevent future crimes for 
which the government under this theory would be at least partially 
to blame. 
There is also statutory support for using a veteran’s service as 
mitigation at sentencing. For instance, the Porter Court cited veteran 
sentencing statutes in Minnesota and California as examples of why 
Mr. Porter’s combat service may have been mitigating.90 
In 2008, Brockton Hunter, along with other Minnesota 
veterans’ advocates, led an effort to draft and pass Minnesota’s law.91 
The law is designed to ensure that mental health diagnoses and 
available treatment options are taken into account in sentencing a 
veteran whose combat trauma played a role in his or her criminal 
88. Lee, supra note 2, at 302–03.
89. Id. at 303 n.118.
90. Porter, 558 U.S. at 44 n.9.
91. See MINN. STAT. § 609.115, subdiv. 10 (2016).
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offense. The law does not force a judge to do anything in a particular 
case. Rather, it gives the judge the tools to make an informed 
decision, recognizing that probationary treatment is often 
preferable to a single stint of incarceration in getting to the root of 
the problem and ensuring long-term public safety. 
In 2007, California passed California Penal Code section 1170.9, 
updating an earlier, Vietnam-specific law that had been found 
ineffective in dealing with the veterans returning from wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.92 Like Minnesota, California has given judges 
the express authority to utilize treatment over incarceration while 
not mandating that the courts follow any particular type of sentence. 
In 2012, California amended section 1170.9 again, adding 
subsection (h), which allows a judge to reduce a felony to a 
misdemeanor and then remove the conviction from the veteran’s 
record if he or she successfully completes probation and treatment 
and demonstrates that he or she is not a danger to the public and 
has benefitted from the court-ordered treatment.93 
What the Minnesota and California statutes do, in effect, is 
make the veteran’s service a relevant sentencing consideration, just 
as the United States Sentencing Guidelines section 5H1.11 did in 
2010. The Guidelines provide that “[m]ilitary service may be relevant 
in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military 
service, individually or in combination with other offender 
characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the 
case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”94 As of early 
2013, there were a total of five states with veterans sentencing 
statutes: California, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Rhode 
Island.95 
This multi-state and federal push for such sentencing mitigation 
guidelines shows that the public’s focus has shifted towards placing 
a higher priority on the treatment of a veteran’s service-related 
92. Adam Caine, Comment, Fallen from Grace: Why Treatment Should Be
Considered for Convicted Combat Veterans Suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 215, 225−29 (2009). 
93. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1170.9 (West, Westlaw through 2016).
94. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2010). 
95. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1170.9; MINN. STAT. § 609.115, subdiv. 10; NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.015(2)(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:4-b (West, Westlaw through 2016); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-29-5 
(West, Westlaw through 2016) (applying to domestic violence cases). 
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impairment and away from a strictly punitive approach to veteran 
defendants. It seems that, amidst the recent wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the American public and the policy-makers working on 
its behalf have made an affirmative decision not to repeat the 
mistakes made when the Vietnam-generation of veterans first came 
into contact with the criminal justice system.96 
Veterans Treatment Courts are another creative way to use the 
veteran defendant’s criminal charges as leverage to ensure the 
veteran actively participates in treatment of his or her service-related 
disorder. The fact that the veteran gets to work through his or her 
problems in an environment with other veterans with similar 
problems allows for higher accountability, greater respect for the 
process, and specialized treatment of service-related disorders.97 A 
study conducted during the summer and fall of 2012 by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Veteran Justice Outreach (VJO) 
Specialists revealed that there are “168 formally established Veterans 
Treatment Courts, Veterans Courts, Veterans Dockets or tracks 
within Mental Health and/or Drug Treatment Courts, or criminal 
Courts,” and “[s]ince the courts’ inception, 7,724 Veterans have 
been admitted, and 3,883 of these Veterans are still being monitored 
by and treated through the courts.”98 California, Colorado, Illinois, 
Oregon, Texas, and Virginia have passed legislation specifically 
permitting the establishment of county veterans treatment courts.99 
Other states have done so directly in their local judicial jurisdictions. 
These courts follow a variety of models, but all offer a veteran 
defendant lower exposure to prison time through diversion to 
96. See generally Brockton D. Hunter, Echoes of War: Combat Trauma, Criminal
Behavior and How We Can Do Better this Time Around, in DEFENDING VETERANS, supra 
note 1, at 1. 
97. See, e.g., Shevory, supra note 24.
98. Jim McGuire et al., VA Veterans Justice Programs, An Inventory of VA Involvement
in Veterans Courts, Dockets and Tracks, VA VETERANS JUSTICE PROGRAMS 5–7 (2013), 
http://www.justiceforvets.org/sites/default/files/files/An%20Inventory%20of 
%20VA%20involvement%20in%20Veterans%20Courts.pdf. 
99. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1170.9; COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3-101,
13-5-144 (West, Westlaw through 2016); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 167 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.886 (West, Westlaw through 
2016); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 124.002 (West, Westlaw through 2016); VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-2001.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016). See generally Veterans Treatment Court 
Legislation, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG CT. PROFS., http://www.nadcp.org/JusticeForVets 
-Legislation (last visited June 1, 2011); Veterans Treatment Court State Legislation, 
JUSTICE FOR VETS, http://justiceforvets.org/state-legislation (last visited May 8, 
2017). 
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judicially supervised rehabilitation programs if the veteran is willing 
to accept responsibility for his or her actions and get help for his or 
her underlying conditions, which usually include PTSD and 
substance abuse. This structure is quite similar to older drug and 
mental health specialty court models, but, by using the existing 
structure and resources of the VA, veterans treatment courts are an 
attractive option for districts that are under budget constraints. Even 
in districts without problem-solving courts, this fiscal reasoning is a 
strong argument in favor of probationary treatment that is uniquely 
available to veteran defendants. Veterans treatment courts are not 
“get out of jail free” courts. Rather, they often employ longer terms 
of probation than the defendant would otherwise be exposed to in 
order to supply leverage and ensure that the veteran stays committed 
to the treatment program until rehabilitated. The level of oversight 
and accountability for participants is often very demanding. By 
having other veterans hold the veteran client accountable, these 
courts “offer the most easily accepted ‘tough love’ support.”100 
Just as a veterans treatment court gets to know a veteran 
individually, an essential element of arguing to the court for a 
lenient or treatment-based sentence outside of veterans court is to 
help the court get to know the veteran, as well as his or her service 
history, and the history of veterans with combat trauma in the 
criminal justice system. By the time the case reaches sentencing, the 
court will already know that the defendant is a veteran, so the 
argument needs to describe the unique characteristics of the 
defendant by focusing in detail on exceptional service records, 
combat experiences, personal hardships caused by service, 
readjustment issues, service to the community, support of friends 
from the military, or any other evidence that will separate this 
veteran defendant from the pack. As section 5H1.11 of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines illustrates, the goal is to distinguish the 
veteran defendant from other defendants via his or her service and 
from all other veteran defendants through his unique experiences, 
as well as to demonstrate that his or her case is not “covered by the 
 100. Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of 
Military Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 570 (2010). 
For an extensive discussion of veteran treatment courts, see generally Robert T. 
Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts, in DEFENDING VETERANS, supra note 1, at 523; Evelyn 
Lundberg Stratton & Corey C. Schaal, Connecting the Dots: Using the Courts and Your 
Own Initiative to Navigate the System, in DEFENDING VETERANS, supra note 1, at 537. 
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Guidelines” or the recommended sentence for the particular 
conviction.101 
Even before the section 5H1.11 change to the Sentencing 
Guidelines, legal scholars, such as Professor Douglas Berman of 
Ohio State, recognized that “more and more courts are noticing and 
asserting, in a variety of ways, that there seems to be some relevance 
to military service, or history of wartime service, to our country.”102 
This has certainly borne out in the federal courts: analysis of the 
thirteen cases for which specific sentencing departure and variance 
information was provided in the United States Sentencing 
Commission’s Case Annotations and Resources: Military Service, USSG 
§5H1.11 Departures, and Booker Variances103 reveals that the average
sentence reduction was between 36% and 49% of the guideline 
sentence range for defendants with significant military service.104 In 
101. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2010). 
102. John Schwartz, Defendants Fresh from War Find Service Counts in Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/us/16soldiers.html?_r=0. 
 103. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, CASE ANNOTATIONS AND RESOURCES:
MILITARY SERVICE, USSG §5H1.11 DEPARTURES, AND BOOKER VARIANCES (2012),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2012_01_Military
_Service_5H1-11_Departures_Booker_Variances.pdf. 
 104. Id. at 6–12. These figures were reached by (1) subtracting the actual 
sentence given from the high and low ends of the Guideline range, reaching a 
reduction range; then (2) dividing that range by the Guideline range to reach a 
percentage reduction for both the low end and the high end of the reduction. For 
example, in United States v. Chapman, 209 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2006), a forty-month 
sentence was given, compared to a Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven 
months. Id. at 1–2. This is a reduction of between thirty to forty-seven months. Thirty 
months divided by seventy months provides a reduction of 43% (the low end of the 
range of reduction), and forty-seven months divided by eighty-seven months 
provides a reduction of 54% (the high end of the reduction range). Thus, the 
sentence was 43% to 54% of the Guideline sentence. Then, these percent reduction 
ranges were averaged by adding all twelve of the low ends and dividing by twelve, 
yielding an average reduction of 35.6% from the low-end of the Guideline ranges; 
and, repeating the process for the high-end reduction range percentages, yielding 
an average reduction of 48.7% from the high-end of the Guideline ranges. The 
following twelve sentences were used in this analysis because they provided specific 








Sentence and Guidelines 
Months Percentage 
United States v. 40 mos. 70−87 mos. 30−47 mos. 43%−54% 
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a specific example, Federal District Court Judge Robert Chambers 
sentenced Timothy Oldani to only five months in prison with three 
years of supervised release conditioned upon treatment, departing 
Chapman, 209 F. 
App’x 3 (1st Cir. 
2006) 
United States v. 
Caruso, 814 F. Supp. 
382 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
6 mos. 12−18 mos. 6−12 mos. 50%−67% 
United States v. 
Fogle, 331 F. App’x 
920 (3d Cir. 2009) 
41 mos. 46−57 mos. 5−16 mos. 11%−28% 
United States v. 
Williams, 332 F. 





68−115 mos. 36%−49% 
United States v. 
Hughes, 370 F. 
App’x 629 (6th Cir. 
2010) 
14 mos. 24−30 mos. 10−16 mos. 42%−53% 
United States v. 
Panyard, 2009 WL 
1099257 (E.D. Mich. 
2009) 
15 mos. 27−33 mos. 12−18 mos. 44%−55% 
United States v. Cole, 
622 F. Supp. 2d 632 
(N.D. Ohio 2008) 
12 mos. 30−37 mos. 18−25 mos. 60%−68% 
United States v. Graf, 
2008 WL 5101696 




9−30 mos. 10%−28% 
United States v. 
Moses, 2007 WL 





26−53 mos. 24%−39% 
United States v. 
Nellum, 2005 WL 





60−102 mos. 36%−49% 
United States v. 
Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 








United States v. Lett, 
483 F.3d 782 (11th 
Cir. 2007) 
60 mos. 70−87 mos. 10−27 mos. 14%−31% 
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significantly from the presumptive sentence of nearly five years for 
selling stolen military night vision equipment.105 The veteran 
defendant was given a downward departure despite the 
prosecution’s argument that he “committed a serious crime and he 
merits serious punishment.”106 
The best and most effective versions of the veteran defense 
counsel’s arguments can be lengthy memoranda, half of which are 
devoted to providing evidence of the veteran as an individual service 
member in a chronological story format.107 Of course, this story 
should be supported by official service documents, such as the 
veteran’s DD-214, corroborating letters or affidavits from people 
who served with the veteran, and any relevant medical treatment 
records. 
The next step is to make the court aware of the authority on 
which to base its decision to extend leniency to a veteran defendant 
in a way that can be easily cut and pasted into its sentencing order. 
As shown in the above section on statutes and veterans courts, there 
is either a statutory or judicial mechanism designed specifically for 
veteran sentencing in many jurisdictions throughout the country. 
Even where such a veteran-specific sentencing statute or veteran 
specialty court is not available, there will always be some grounds on 
which a judge is able to depart from the recommended sentence. 
This may be a general mental health sentencing statute similar to the 
Minnesota statute, which states, 
When a court intends to commit an offender with a serious 
and persistent mental illness . . . the court, when consistent 
with public safety, may instead place the offender on 
probation . . . and require as a condition of the probation 
that the offender successfully complete an appropriate 
supervised alternative living program having a mental 
health treatment component.108 
In Minnesota, and likely in most states with similar statutes,109 
PTSD satisfies the statutory definition of a serious and persistent 
105. Schwartz, supra note 102. 
106. Id. 
107. See, e.g., Position of Defendant with Respect to Sentencing, United States v. 
Carson, No. 10-mj-2 JJG (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2010); Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Motion for Sentencing Departure, State v. Klecker, No. 19-K7-06-003438 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. June 21, 2007). 
108. MINN. STAT. § 609.1055 (2016). 
 109. To illustrate the wide acceptance of probationary sentencing for offenders 
with serious and persistent mental illness, as of 2011, there are at least one hundred 
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mental illness because PTSD is an Axis I diagnosis under the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders110 and “the underlying studies have met statistical 
criteria for validity.”111 Whatever is the best local legal authority 
available, it should be presented in the context of a national judicial 
and legislative movement in favor of leniency and treatment over 
incarceration in combat veteran cases. This allows the court to justify 
a departure on public policy grounds and avoid the label of being a 
“rogue” court. 
The importance to the sentencing court of laying down 
adequate justification pinned to a legitimate source of authority 
when departing is articulated clearly in United States District Court 
Senior Judge John L. Kane’s Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
Sentencing in United States v. Brownfield, in which Judge Kane spends 
seven of the thirty pages of the order tying his decision to “the need 
for the sentence imposed” factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even 
after spending three pages explaining why he was justified in 
departing from the Sentencing Guidelines.112 The fact that “the 
Sentencing Guidelines do not address [issues] regarding the 
criminal justice system’s treatment of returning veterans who have 
served in Afghanistan and Iraq” troubled Judge Kane, so he ensured 
that his order was published and distributed to the United States 
Sentencing Commission.113 This not only shows the immense 
concern that the issues surrounding veteran defendants can raise in 
judges but also demonstrates the need for those judges to ground 
their decisions in legal justification, even when they feel morally 
compelled to provide a lenient sentence. This same order is also a 
fine glimpse into the way judges can receive the arguments of the 
veteran’s individual service, as Judge Kane explains the service 
history of the defendant and the connection of this service to a PTSD 
mental health courts in thirty-four different states around the United States. See 
Charles Amrhein & Virginia Barber-Rioja, Jail Diversion Models for People with Mental 
Illness, in SERVICE DELIVERY FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 329, 342 (Steven A. Estrine et al. eds., 2011). 
 110. THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 467–68 
(Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 4th ed. 1994). 
111. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 77, at 30. 
 112. Memorandum, Opinion and Order on Sentencing at 8–10, 23–30, United 
States v. Brownfield, No. 08-cr-00452-JLK (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2009) 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/BrownfieldTakeThree.pdf. 
113. Id. at 1. 
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diagnosis in-depth.114 Judge Kane then cites to Porter’s statement of 
our Nation’s “long tradition of according leniency to veterans” to 
justify probation as a fitting consequence, even though both the 
defense attorney and the prosecutor were requesting a sentence of a 
year and a day.115 This departure is just one example of how 
successful an expertly-crafted sentencing argument can be when the 
judge sees the defendant as a unique combat veteran with adequate 
alternatives to prison. 
VIII. THE SCIENTIFIC LINK BETWEEN PTSD AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR:
WHY IT IS LEGALLY IRRELEVANT 
Much is made of trying to find a definitive causal link between 
combat trauma or other service-related disorders and criminal 
behavior. Studies to this effect have been inconclusive,116 but this is 
immaterial to the task faced by the criminal justice system when a 
veteran defendant stands before it. A veteran defendant’s combat 
trauma is only relevant in two ways. First, in the case of insanity or 
other defenses discussed in Part VI above, there can be no question 
that the condition caused the criminal behavior because that is the 
entire presumption of the defense. Second, the disorder may be 
used in sentencing mitigation, which, by definition, means that the 
disorder is being considered within the totality of the defendant’s 
circumstances but is not being used as a defense to the conduct as 
an uncontrollable product of the disorder. 
In the first case, it is not relevant whether or not there is 
generally a definitive link between PTSD and criminal behavior. The 
only relevant consideration is whether, in the present case, the 
defendant’s disorder was such that he or she did not understand that 
the act was wrong or that he or she was unable to control his or her 
conduct. Such PTSD-based insanity defenses usually arise out of a 
dissociative flashback in which the defendant believes he or she is 
back in combat or, in cases of automatism, in which the defendant 
was reacting without conscious thought in a manner consistent with 
114. See id. at 3–5. 
115. See id. at 2–3, 24 (quoting Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009)). 
116. DAVID DANIEL, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND THE CASUAL [SIC] LINK
TO CRIME: A LOOMING NATIONAL TRAGEDY 7 (2008) (unpublished monograph, 
United States Army Command and General Staff College), 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll3/id/2291. 
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a combat environment, such as reflexive shooting.117 In such cases, 
the fact finder will consider whether or not the defendant’s disorder 
was directly connected to the criminal behavior in that case alone.118 
While it may be useful to be able to point to a scientific link between 
PTSD and crime in presenting such a defense, some defendants with 
PTSD will meet the insanity defense standard and some will not, 
depending upon the type and degree of the disorder. 
In the case of sentencing mitigation, the defendant’s PTSD or 
other service-related disorder is not used to argue that the 
defendant’s conduct was a result of the disorder. Rather, the 
disorder is just one of multiple circumstances which are used to show 
that (1) the defendant is less culpable than the average person 
convicted of the offense,119 and (2) if the disorder is treated, there is 
a lower risk of recidivism and less public safety risk.120 Neither of 
these considerations relies upon the belief that the defendant’s 
PTSD caused the criminal act. These considerations are only 
presented in order to assert that the defendant’s PTSD and related 
problems, such as alcoholism or risk-taking behavior, contributed 
significantly to the defendant committing the offense and that the 
defendant would have been less likely to commit the offense but for 
the disorder.121 Once again, a definitive link between crime and 
PTSD may be superficially persuasive in seeking sentencing 
mitigation, but will never be as effective as making a detailed showing 
of how the veteran defendant’s disorder has contributed to the 
circumstances of the particular offense before the court. 
To illustrate these points, it is helpful to look at how a disorder 
that has been definitively linked to criminal behavior is treated in a 
criminal case. The medical community has determined that 
schizophrenia increases a sufferer’s risk of committing a violent 
crime by four to six times.122 Despite this established link, however, 
 117. See Melissa Hamilton, Reinvigorating Actus Reus: The Case for Involuntary 
Actions by Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 340, 340–
42 (2011). 
118. Id. at 345. 
119. Id. at 342. 
120. Id. at 362. 
121. Anthony E. Giardino, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death 
Penalty: Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain 
Injury, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2955, 2961 (2009) (“Combat veterans would not have 
service-related PTSD or TBI but for government action in the form of training them 
to kill and sending them to war.”). 
122. Seena Fazel et al., Schizophrenia, Substance Abuse, and Violent Crime, 301 J.
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when a schizophrenic defendant appears in criminal court asserting 
an insanity defense, he or she has the same burden to establish the 
lack of personal knowledge of the wrongful nature of the act or of 
the inability to control his or her actions at the time of the offense.123 
Even if the requirements for a legal defense are not met, a judge can 
consider the impact of schizophrenia on the defendant and the 
circumstances surrounding the offense.124 There is no free pass for 
a schizophrenic just because academia has recognized a causal link 
between schizophrenia and criminal behavior in general, and there 
will be none for veterans with service-related disorders regardless of 
whether a causal link is ever established. 
IX. CONCLUSION
The take-away message is that the defense must present the 
veteran’s story to prosecutors, judges, and juries as soon as possible. 
The defense must demonstrate how the veteran’s service or any 
service-related mental health problems are relevant to the case and 
give the decision-maker an outlet through which to show leniency—
be it dismissed charges, a mitigated sentence, or a not guilty verdict. 
Under all of these approaches, the most important element is to 
present the veteran’s individual service history while placing that 
history into the context of the larger past failings in dealing with 
criminally-involved veterans and the public policy necessity to avoid 
such failures with this generation of veterans. As shown above, when 
this is done properly, it can achieve favorable results for the veteran 
client. Just as important, this can be incredibly rewarding 
professionally as it gives the defense attorney the opportunity to 
passionately defend one of those who has defended us. 
AMER. MED. ASSOC. 2016, 2016 (2009), 
http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/183929. 
 123. Danielle N. Devens, Competency for Execution in the Wake of Panetti: Shifting 
the Burden to the Government, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (2010). 
124. See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
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